Deleuze and Human Rights: The Optimism and Pessimism of ’68

The paper takes as its point of departure the claim of Alain Badiou that the events of 1968 have two possible outcomes, “one pessimistic” and one “optimistic” (2015: 43-44). It suggests that one of the main manifestations of the pessimistic outcome is the triumph of human rights thought as a form of the only true measure of morality, a new transcendent subject. On the other hand, it suggests that one of the optimistic outcomes of 1968 is the political turn that the philosophical thought of Gilles Deleuze took as a result of the events of '68. The paper brings together these two oppositional manifestations of '68 by exploring and critically examining the critique of human rights of Deleuze. In particular, it focuses on his claim that rights are a new form of transcendence. As such, the paper explores Deleuze’s critical comments on the notion of transcendence and his preference for an immanent mode of thought, and it tries to connect this with his critique of rights, through the distinction he makes between ethics and morality. The paper argues that such an exploration, potentially, points towards a new way of thinking ethically about human rights or beyond them.